

Festival Games: Inebriated and Sober Altruists

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Abstract

We run a staged field experiment during three concerts in the South of Italy, characterized by the same traditional music and a comparable average level of alcohol consumption by attendees. Individual blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is measured with electronic breathalyzers. The experimental games proposed to concert attendees are mini-games of payoff equivalent private and common property games (Cox et al. 2009). We find that alcohol consumption leads to less pro-social behavior independently of the version of the game, and that the rate of efficient choices is more than twice as high in the private property game than in the common property game. Efficiency of play decreases with alcohol consumption, increases with belief about the percentage of participants who are not inebriated, and is higher for tourists than local participants.

Keywords: Staged Field Experiment, Alcohol, Private Property Game, Common Property Game, Reciprocity, Tourists

JEL codes: C72, C93, Z10, Z32

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1. Introduction

Music festivals are among few social events, where a combination of music and alcohol consumption lessen, for some, the awkwardness of socializing with strangers. There are only a few studies (Attanasi et al. 2017) that investigate whether, and to what extent, alcohol consumption facilitates the creation of instantaneous social capital, i.e. the enhancement of trust in other festival attendees due to event attendance (Arcodia and Whitford 2006). Attanasi et al. (2017) find that both measured and perceived alcohol consumption boost instantaneous social capital, thereby leading to alcohol-related endogenous group formation during event attendance.

Other studies use laboratory experiments to study the effect of random assignment to a prescribed amount of alcohol consumption or no alcohol consumption on altruistic and cooperative behavior (Au and Zhang 2016, Bregu et al. 2017, Corazzini et al. 2015, Hopthrow et al. 2007, and Karlsson et al. 2022). Findings are mixed: negative correlation between alcohol consumption and altruism is reported by Corazzini et al. (2015) and Au and Zhang (2016), positive correlation reported by Karlsson et al. 2022, and no significant association between the two reported by Bregu et al. (2017). Moderate alcohol consumption seems to increase subjects' willingness to collaborate (Bregu et al. 2017) by smoothing the negotiation process. But Hopthrow et al. (2007), who study alcohol consumption and group belonging, report no effect on cooperative behavior.

This paper builds on the methodology of Attanasi et al. (2017) to study effects of self-selection into alcohol consumption “in the wild” where social signaling and reputational concerns are salient. It extends previous literature in several directions. First, we conduct a staged field experiment in music festivals with monetary incentives and strategic interactions among event participants. Second, we study the effects of actual alcohol consumption, and beliefs about it, on two distinct features of strategic altruism, where efficiency gains can be created through trust actions that are vulnerable to defection (absent reciprocity). Third, we run the staged field experiment in three events with variation in size and (tourist vs. non-tourist) attendee composition to study the relationship between alcohol consumption and pro-social behavior. Fourth, compared to lab experiments, music festivals provide a more realistic setting of participant self-selection into alcohol consumption or abstention and a higher variability in blood alcohol concentration.

We run mini-game versions of the private property and common property games in Cox et al. (2009). Due to blood alcohol concentration measurement, we end up having a 2x3 staged field design, with “Sober” (0 blood alcohol concentration), “Legally Sober” (blood alcohol concentration does not exceed 0.5 g/l) or “Inebriated” (blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.5 g/l) participants being the other treatment variable. This design allows us to study game form effects on behavior of sober and inebriated participants, and differential effects on conditional altruism (second mover behavior) and strategic altruism (first mover behavior).

We find that alcohol consumption leads to less pro-social behavior: (i) 59.5% of Sober first movers (BAC=0) send money compared to 46% of first movers with positive BAC, and (ii) 81% of Sober second movers

return money compared to 68% of second movers with positive BAC. Furthermore, the percentage of efficient choice is more than twice as high in the private property game (72%) than in the common property game (33%).

2. Methods

Three hundred participants were recruited from concert attendees in three southern Italian villages, located within a 20-km radius in the Province of Lecce, and similar in terms of economic and social indicators. A staged field experiment was run during three cultural events, one in each village, taking place on August 24, August 30, and October 5, 2013.¹

The three concerts were held in three different locations with similar structure and cultural environment. All of the concerts were free entry, started at the same time (8 pm), lasted at least 4 hours and were held in a central square of the village. More importantly, the three villages share a long-lasting and deep-rooted tradition, called tarantism, a legend that nowadays identifies these and a few other villages within the Province of Lecce as an independent cultural area (Grecia Salentina). Each concert was part of a folk music festival promoting the traditional musical repertoire characteristic of tarantism, which represents the cultural heritage of this area.²

More precisely, tarantism is a form of hysteric behavior, popularly believed to result from the bite of the wolf spider *Lycosa tarantula*.³ The evocative and theatrical representation of the traditional post-bite therapeutic dance – the tarantella – has recently been incorporated into the pizzica and related music genres which, combined together with folk beats coming from different cultural backgrounds, are the core element of the concerts we analyze in this paper.⁴ Such concerts usually attract young attendees, enjoying an exciting atmosphere, with frenetic dancing and alcohol consumption.⁵ Concerts taking place in the month of August also had a significant tourist impact on the area where the concerts were held, the Province of Lecce, with many attendees not residing in the province (from now on, “tourists”) being on summer vacation in the area, some just to attend these concerts. In particular, as Attanasi et al. (2013) show, the highest percentage of tourists among attendees during these concerts is usually detected in the first (and most famous) concert among those we study, La Notte della Taranta

¹ The three villages are Melpignano (2000 inhabitants), Carpignano (4000 inhabitants) and Cutrofiano (9000 inhabitants). They are located at the end of southeast Italy, at the very bottom of the Apulia region, the Italian heel (see the map at http://www.punto-salento.it/immagini/cartina_lecce.gif).

² The name of the three festivals, in chronological order, are: Il Festival de La Notte della Taranta (16th edition, August 6 - 4, 2013, final concert held in Melpignano on August 24, festival website [here](#)); La Festa Te lu Mieru (38th edition, Carpignano, August 30 - September 1, 2013, festival website [here](#)); Li Ucci Festival (3rd edition, October 2 - 5 2013, Cutrofiano, festival website [here](#)).

³ Popular belief has it that during the summer harvest, when spiders are about, the bite of the tarantula drove its victims, mainly women, to a state of unconsciousness to come out of which the healing ritual found the music as main cure. The bite-victims were induced to engage in a frenzied dancing because of a fast-paced therapeutic music, believing that the sweat produced by dancing frantically would release the venom from the body (see, e.g., Attanasi 2007).

⁴ These concerts are a true musical melting pot which, successfully started at the end of the 90s with the fusion of sounds coming from the Byzantine, the Balkan or the Turkish culture, keep being attractive nowadays thanks to the original mixture of traditional music with contemporary tunes such as jazz, rock, classical and world music.

⁵ See Attanasi et al. (2017) for the connection between traditional music, frenetic dancing, and alcohol consumption during these concerts.

festival, held each year during the last Saturday of August, where there are more tourists than locals among concert attendees. Subsequently, the percentage of tourists attending such cultural events in the Province of Lecce slightly decreases until the end of August, and is negligible after the end of September.⁶

The experimental procedure consisted of two consecutive phases: initial sampling (phase 1) and the experiment itself (phase 2). Both phases were programmed and implemented using the EconPlay software (www.econplay.fr) of the Laboratory of Experimental Economics of Strasbourg (LEES).

Phase 1: Initial sampling

Early in the concert (from 8 pm until 10 pm), we elicited attendees' idiosyncratic features by individual guided interviews through tablets.⁷ About 20 (graduate student) interviewers independently selected respondents in different points of the square where the concert was held.⁸

We analyzed data in real time inside our mobile laboratory, located in the same square as the concert. The representativeness of our sample with respect to the population of attendees in each concert has been controlled for through the Marbach test (Marbach, 2000), according to which margin of errors lower than 0.05 are normally seen as acceptable in the literature.

As shown in Table 1, the three cohorts of concert attendees had similar demographic characteristics: age (around half of attendees below 25, and 3/4 below 30); education (half with a high-school diploma, another 1/3 with a university degree); gender (6/10 males); student status (at least 3/10 of attendees being, mainly undergraduate, students); blood alcohol concentration, measured through electronic breathalyzers (equal to around 0.4 g/l on average, the accepted limit for car drivers in Italy being 0.5 g/l).

Furthermore, consistent with our expectations about tourist trend in the area where the concerts were held, Table 1 shows: a higher percentage of tourists than locals in concert 1, by far the main summer cultural event in the area; a lower percentage of tourists than locals in concert 2 (significantly different from concert 1 at the 1% level); and a negligible percentage of tourists in the last concert. Indeed, the difference in the percentage of tourists across the three concerts is a treatment variable in the experimental design of phase 2. More precisely, our control treatment is a concert with no tourists among attendees. This is why we waited for the end of the summer season to run the control (concert 3), and we run our main treatment (concert 1) during the closing event of the La Notte della Taranta. This event (called Concertone) is the one with the highest number of attendees in the area each year,

⁶ As the official statistics of the Tourism Observatory of the Province of Lecce reports (see, e.g., http://www.le.camcom.gov.it/lecceosservatorioturismo/pages/dom_movxmese.htm), the tourist attraction of the area is mainly seasonal, with about 88% of tourists over the year coming to the area in June–September, with 41% coming in the month of August. The month of October only accounts for 2% of the tourists over the 12 months.

⁷ Our questionnaire is similar to the one used by Attanasi et al. (2013) to elicit the economic and social impact of previous editions of the same cultural events.

⁸ The number of participants in each concert has been estimated by crosschecking the data provided by the Traffic Officer Commands of each municipality with the data we personally collected under the guidance of a surveyor usually residing in the municipality where the concert took place.

and the one with the highest percentage of tourists among attendees across concerts of the same type and repertoire.

Table 1. Sample Attendees' Demographic Characteristics

Concert	Date	Population of attendees	Sample size (margin of error)	Age (<25, 25-30, >30)	Education (<HS, HS, >HS)	Males	Students	Tourists	Alcohol (BAC)
1	Aug. 24, 2013	100,000	407 (0.0495)	(55%, 21%, 24%)	(15%, 56%, 29%)	60%	42%	70%	0.37 g/l
2	Aug. 30, 2013	15,000	405 (0.0491)	(44%, 29%, 27%)	(11%, 52%, 37%)	67%	30%	41%	0.42 g/l
3	Oct. 5, 2013	11,000	394 (0.0494)	(41%, 31%, 28%)	(16%, 49%, 35%)	58%	33%	3%	0.39 g/l

Note: Margin of error has been calculated according to the Marbach test (Marbach, 2000). It associates the pair of variables N (size of the target population) and n (sample size) with a parameter x that specifies the tolerated margin of error occurring when the sample of size n is taken as representative of the whole population N: $x = \sqrt{N / (N - 1) n - 1 / (N - 1)}$. For Education, HS stands for “High School Diploma”, hence <HS (>HS) indicates the estimated percentage of attendees holding a diploma lower (higher) than the high school one. Alcohol (BAC) indicates the average level of blood alcohol concentration, measured through an electronic breathalyzer.

Phase 2: Experimental Recruiting

Immediately after the end of population sampling (i.e., from 10 pm onward), we selected subjects as experimental participants and verified that none of them were part of the sample of attendees interviewed in phase 1. At the end of the experiment, participants filled in the same questionnaire previously filled in by subjects interviewed in phase 1; the results are reported in Table 2. Our experimental participants are representative of the population of

Table 2. Experimental Participants' Demographic Characteristics

Concert	Date	Population of attendees	Experimental Participants	Age (<25, 25-30, >30)	Education (<HS, HS, >HS)	Males	Students	Tourists	Alcohol (BAC)
1	Aug. 24, 2013	100,000	120	(72%, 13%, 15%)	(17%, 61%, 22%)	53%	46%	66%	0.35 g/l
2	Aug. 30, 2013	15,000	120	(38%, 31%, 31%)	(5%, 53%, 42%)	66%	24%	34%	0.45 g/l
3	Oct. 5, 2013	11,000	60	(28%, 44%, 28%)	(13%, 49%, 38%)	57%	27%	0%	0.40 g/l

Note: Education and alcohol labels are the same as in Table 1.

attendees in each concert where the staged field experiment was run. The distributions of age and education, and the percentages of males, students and tourists in the experimental subject pool (Table 2) are all not significantly different than in the population of concert attendees (Table 1) according to the Marbach test (see note to Table 1). We also controlled for the number of tourists in our pool of experimental participants. Considering all concerts together, we ended up having 120 tourists and 180 locals voluntarily participating in our experiment. In concerts 1 and 2, we let subjects participate in the experiment independently from being a local or a tourist. In concert 1,

we ended up having 41 locals and 79 tourists participating in the experiment. In concert 2, we stopped looking around for participants after 79 locals and 41 tourists had already participated in the experiment. In concert 3 we found no tourists when looking for experimental participants, which is consistent with tourists being only 3% of the attendees (as reported in Table 1).

In all concerts, attendees invited to participate in the experiment were told they would be randomly paired with another concert participant, connected through another tablet in another point of the square at around the same time, and they would play an experimental game described in the next section.

During concert 3 (control), our experimental game was played among locals only, and this was public information within each pair. Conversely, in concert 1 and 2, subjects were not informed whether their matched participant was a local or a tourist. Before playing the experimental game, we asked participants to guess the percentage of locals participating in the experimental game during that concert, to check that none of the subjects believed they could be paired only with a local or with a tourist. Due to the huge number of people drinking alcohol during these concerts (average measured BAC being around 0.4 g/l in each concert), we also asked experimental participants to guess the percentage of subjects participating in the experimental game with BAC smaller than or equal to 0.5 g/l.⁹

Each session was conducted through 8 tablets connected to a mobile laboratory located in the center of the concert. Each tablet was assigned to an interviewer who looked for a participant among the concert attendees, their size ranging from 10,000 to 100,000 people, depending on the concert. The eight interviewers – always the same in each concert – were located at different points of the concert area, far away from each other, so as to ensure subject anonymity during experiment participation.

The selected participant made his/her choice in the game through the tablet, without the interviewer looking at his/her choice.¹⁰ His/her co-player participated in the experiment through another tablet and interviewer. The tablets were programmed so that the next randomly selected subject would be matched with the previous one, so for paired subjects play of the game was almost simultaneous. We use the strategy method for second movers.

At the end of the experimental game, the interviewer gave the subject a tablet ID and accompanied them to our mobile laboratory location. The experimental software produced an Excel file containing the subjects' choices, which were projected on a large screen, at the entry of the mobile laboratory. To ensure anonymity, the subject learned their payoff by looking for their tablet ID on the large screen. Then they moved to another room where one of the experimental assistants measured their BAC through an electronic breathalyzer. Finally, the subject filled in a final questionnaire and was paid their earnings in cash and in private.

⁹ Under Italian law, 0.5 g/l is the accepted limit of BAC for all car drivers except those less than 21 years of age or having obtained the driving license within the preceding 3 years. (Car drivers in Italy must be at least 18 years of age.) For these categories, there is zero tolerance (BAC equal to 0.0 g/l).

¹⁰ After reading the instructions on the tablet together with the subject, the interviewer gave the tablet to the subject and waited for him/her to choose at a reasonable distance from the subject. After the subject made his/her choice, this disappeared from the tablet's screen, and instructions on the tablet screen invited the subject to give the tablet back to the interviewer.

Average earning was €18.61 including a €3 show-up fee. The whole procedure – from the moment the subject accepted to participate in the experiment until the moment he/she left the mobile laboratory with his/her earnings – lasted 25 minutes on average.

3. The Experimental Games

The two versions of the game that subjects played in our staged field experiment are mini-games of the Private Property Game and Common Property Game in Cox, et al. (2009).

3. Private Property Game

In this game each player is endowed with a Private Fund of €10. The first mover can choose to keep the €10, and end the game, or send all of it to the second mover. The amount sent is tripled and added to the endowment of the second mover. The second mover can choose to return €0, €15, or €20, which determines, respectively, the (First Mover, Second Mover) payoffs of (€0, €40), (€15, €25), or (€20, €20).

3.2 Common Property Game

In this game each pair of players is endowed with a Group Fund containing €40. The first mover can choose to take €10 from the Group Fund or take nothing. If the first mover takes €10 then the value of the Group Fund is reduced by an additional €20, which leaves the second mover with payoff of €10, and the game ends. If the first mover takes nothing then the second mover can share the €40 endowment of the Group Fund by allocating €0, €15, or €20 to the First Mover, which determines, respectively, the (First Mover, Second Mover) payoffs of (€0, €40), (€15, €25), or (€20, €20).

3.3 Main Behavioral Predictions

The two games are payoff equivalent, and therefore models of conventional preferences and unconditional social preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Andreoni and Miller 2002, Cox and Sadiraj 2007) predict no game-form effect on behavior. First mover sending or not taking are both kind actions, and have exactly the same payoff consequences in either game, so the reciprocity kindness model (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004) also predicts no game-form effect. In contrast, the reveal altruism model makes the following predictions. The second mover faces two possible opportunity sets in either game, $E = \{(0,40), (15,25), (20,20)\}$ and the singleton set, $S = \{(10,10)\}$. So, with respect to the second mover, set E is More Generous Than set S (Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj, 2008) because the maximum payoff feasible for the second mover increases by 30 euros (from 10 in S to 40 in E) whereas for the first mover the maximum possible payoff increases by only 10 euros (from 10 in S to 20 in E). In the Private Property game, the opportunity set E is made available by the first mover choosing to pass all the endowment to the second mover, an act of commission. In the Common Property game the second mover faces E only if the first mover maintains the status quo by not taking 10 (an act of

omission). Axiom S (in Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj, 2008) requires the second mover's choice from E to be (weakly) more generous in the Private Property Game than in the Common Property Game. Any deviation from the initial private endowment in the Private Property Game is perceived as a generous act. Maintaining the common endowment (40) in the Common Property Game is also perceived as a generous act, but because it preserves the status quo it is less generous than in the Private Property Game. Anticipating that the second mover will be (weakly) more generous in the Private Property Game than in the Common Property Game, the first mover's propensity to trust is predicted to be higher in the former than in the latter version of the game.

Null Hypothesis. Models of unconditional preferences and the reciprocity kindness model predict no game-form effect on behavior.

Alternative Hypothesis. Revealed altruism theory predicts higher returns by second movers in the Private Property Game than in the Common Property Game.

We also state a behavioral hypothesis that is based on previous experimental findings on the effect of alcohol consumption on pro-social behavior (see the literature review in section 1. We classify as Inebriated those subjects with a BAC higher than 0.5 g/l, Legally Sober the ones with positive BAC but not exceeding 0.5 g/l, and Sober participants with BAC=0. We expect to observe less returned by Inebriated second movers than by Sober ones and a positive effect on first movers' propensity to send 10 or take 0 of the belief about the likelihood of being matched with a Sober second mover.

Behavioral Hypothesis. Inebriated second movers return less than Sober ones, and the propensity of first movers to send 10 or take 0 increases with belief in the percentage of Sober participants.

4. Results

Out of 300 participants, about half (48%) were Sober (BAC=0) and the remaining half were equally split between being Legally Sober (26% with positive BAC not exceeding 0.5 g/l) and Inebriated (26% with BAC exceeding 0.5 g/l).¹¹ We first report on second movers' behavior and then turn our attention to first movers.

4.1 Second Movers

At the aggregate level, we find that alcohol consumption leads to less generosity as 81% of Sober second movers do not keep everything but only 68% of the ones with positive BAC do the same (Pearson $\chi^2(1)=3.40$, p -value=0.065). Figure 1 shows second movers' choices of return amounts of 0, 15 or 20 across the two games for

¹¹ The exact figures are (48%, 24%, 28%) in the Private Property Game and (47%, 28%, 25%) in the Common Property Game.

three alcohol levels. The top row of graphs are for the Common Property Game. The bottom row of graphs are for the Private Property Game. The left to right positioning of graphs is for Inebriated, Legally Sober and Sober participants. The following patterns are visible: (i) the most-selfish response (keep all 40 and return 0) is lowest (25% or 12% depending on the game) among Sober participants and highest 33% among Inebriated; and (ii) Sober participants are more reciprocal in the Private (67% returning 20) than in the Common (50% returning 20) Property Game.




Figure 1. SM Actions in the Common (top row) and Private (bottom row) Property Games

These visual patterns of returns are consistent with linear estimated coefficients for the Common Property Game and alcohol level categories reported in Table 3. The dependent variable is the second mover's choice and the control group is Sober (BAC=0) subjects in the Private Property Game. We use as regressors the following dummies: participation in the Common Property Game and participant's observed BAC being positive and whether or not it exceeds 0.5. In the other model specifications, we include "guess % of participants Not Inebriated" (columns 2 and 3), being a tourist (column 3) and other demographic variables such as gender, age, earning income, intelligence and being a smoker.

The data exhibit some evidence in favor of Revealed Altruism as the estimated coefficient for the Common Property Game is negative, suggesting less generous (reciprocal) response than in the Private Property Game. Alcohol consumption has a negative effect on returns for both Legally Sober and Inebriated participants. As expected, tourists appear to be more generous. Our first two summary results are:

Result 1. The Common Property Game elicits less generosity than the Private Property Game; the difference is not statistically significant.

Result 2. Pros-sociality (generosity) decreases with alcohol consumption.

Table 3. Determinants of Second Mover Behavior (Linear Regression)

Dep. Var: Return	(1)	(2)	(3)
Common Property Game (CPG)	-2.765 (2.006)	-2.398 (2.021)	-2.199 (2.004)
Legally Sober	-4.372* (2.324)	-4.192* (2.322)	-4.388* (2.241)
Inebriated (BAC > .5)	-4.372* (2.324)	-4.464* (2.319)	-5.440** (2.300)
CPG x Legally Sober	3.747 (3.196)	3.081 (3.228)	3.582 (3.168)
CPG x Inebriated	2.622 (3.456)	1.952 (3.485)	4.176 (3.532)
Guess % “Not Inebriated” Participants		-3.776 (2.871)	0.791 (2.990)
Tourist (D)			3.730*** (1.411)
Constant	16.515*** (1.449)	17.982*** (1.826)	14.077*** (4.215)
<i>Demographics</i>	no	no	yes
Observations	150	150	150
R-squared	0.040	0.051	0.208

Notes. Demographics include age, gender, smoking, “Earning Income” (participants who selected categories “Employee”, or “Self Employed” or “Free Lance”), subject’s reported Likert score on statements related to risk assessment before engaging in an activity and propensity to seek and pursue opportunities, and performance in a cognition test (a participant is classified as “Low IQ” if their score in a test was below 0.1 and “High IQ if their score was 0.5 or higher. The average score was 0.17 and the range was [0, 2.1].) Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.2 First Mover Behavior

Results 1 and 2 reveal that first movers’ returns from sending 10 or taking 0 will increase with the percentage of Sober second movers and be marginally higher in the Private Property Game. The expected return to a first mover of an aggregate-payoff efficient choice (send 10 or take 0) with positive second mover BAC is about €12 in either game but when the second mover is Sober then the figure is €14 in the Common Property game and increases to €16.55 in the Private Property game.¹²

¹² For example, €12=(.27*15+.4*20) for Inebriated in the Common Property game. Similarly, for Sober second movers in the Common Property game, €13.75=(.25*15+.5*20) and in the Private Property game, €16.55=(.21*15+.67*20).

At the aggregate level, we find that the percentage of efficient choices is more than twice as high in the Private Property Game (72%) than in the Common Property Game (33%) and that alcohol consumption leads to less efficient behavior with 46% of positive BAC participants sending 10 or taking 0 compared to 59.5% of Sober (BAC=0) participants (Pearson $\chi^2(1)=2.7$, $p\text{-value}=0.100$). Our third result is:

Result 3. Efficiency decreases with alcohol consumption.

Figure 2 shows first movers' choices across the two games for three alcohol levels. The top row of little figures in Figure 2 show the percentages of first movers choosing “take 10 euros” (i.e., *leave* 0 euros) in the left-side bar or “take 0 euros” (i.e., *leave* 10 euros) in the right-side bar in the Common Property Game. The left to right position of little figures corresponds to Inebriated, Legally Sober, or Sober subjects. The bottom row of little figures show the percentages of first movers choosing “send 0 euros” in the left-side bar or “send 10 euros” in the




Figure 2. FM Actions in the Common (top row) and Private (bottom row) Property Games

right-side bar. Recall that efficiency can be generated only by a first mover's decision to send 10 or take 0; the second mover's decision is simply a distribution choice. A game effect is visible with lower efficiency elicited in the Common Property (efficient choices vary between 27% and 43% depending on alcohol consumption) than in the Private (efficient choices almost double varying between 67% and 74%) Property Game. The detrimental effect of alcohol consumption on efficiency is more pronounced in the Common Property Game where we observe about 43% of Sober participants electing to send 10 or take 0 with the figure dropping to less than 27% for participants with some alcohol consumption.

Table 4 shows the determinants of behavior of festival attendees in the role of first mover. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the first mover decides to “send 10” or “take 0”. The omitted category, is sober first movers in the Private Property Game. Other regressors are the same as the ones included in the models in Table 3. The estimated coefficient of the Common Property Game is negative, suggesting efficiency loss (forgone surplus) compared to the Private Property Game. The positive estimated coefficient of “guess % of participants Not Inebriated” on first movers’ propensity to make an efficient choice is consistent with the Behavioral Hypothesis. Our next summary result is:

Result 4. The Common Property Game elicits less efficiency than the Private Property Game.

The estimated coefficients for the Tourist dummy variable and the Guess % “Not Inebriated” Participants variable are significantly positive. This gives us our last summary result.

Result 5. Efficiency of play increases with belief about the percentage of participants who are not inebriated and is higher for tourists.

Table 4. Determinants of First Mover Behavior (Probit Regression)

Dep. Var: “Send 10” or “Take 0”	(1)	(2)	(3)
Common Property Game (CPG)	-0.834*** (0.304)	-0.805*** (0.308)	-1.001*** (0.353)
Legally Sober	-0.032 (0.410)	0.027 (0.413)	-0.025 (0.439)
Inebriated (BAC > .5)	-0.224 (0.357)	-0.215 (0.356)	-0.283 (0.386)
CPG x Legally Sober	-0.553 (0.567)	-0.651 (0.582)	-0.517 (0.622)
CPG x Inebriated	-0.201 (0.504)	-0.397 (0.515)	-0.480 (0.558)
Guess % “Not Inebriated” Participants		1.131** (0.493)	1.873*** (0.583)
Tourist (D)			0.650** (0.277)
Constant	0.654*** (0.217)	0.250 (0.279)	-0.741 (0.724)
<i>Demographics</i>	no	no	yes
Observations	150	150	150
R-squared	0.127	0.153	0.232

Notes. “Demographics” are the same as in Table 3 note. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5. Concluding Remarks

Most previous experimental papers on effects of alcohol consumption have reported differences in behavior between subjects randomly assigned to a control treatment of zero alcohol consumption and others randomly assigned to a treatment with a prescribed amount of alcohol consumption. These designs support conclusions about the implications for experimental task performance of the effects of exogenously controlled amounts of alcohol in a laboratory setting. We ask a different question. Our question is the effects on behavior in experimental tasks of subjects' self-selection into alcohol consumption in a social context. We study subjects who have self-selected into attendance at a music festival. We compare behavior in experimental tasks of festival attendees who self-selected zero alcohol consumption or moderate consumption or intoxication. The experimental tasks we offer subjects are choices in payoff-equivalent private and common property games.

The Common Property Game elicits significantly less efficiency than the Private Property Game, which contrasts with the insignificant difference reported in a similar laboratory experiment (Cox, et al. 2009). We find that alcohol consumption leads to less pro-social behavior with about 14% more Sober first movers (BAC=0) than the ones with positive BAC making efficient choice (creating or not destroying surplus) and about 13% more Sober second movers returning money than the ones with positive BAC. Furthermore, the percentage of efficient choice is more than twice as high in the Private Property Game (72%) than in the Common Property Game (33%).

Further attestation to the importance of experimenting in a natural social context is provided by additional results in Tables 3 and 4. The efficiency of allocation increases with the subjects' guess about the percentage of participants who are *not* inebriated. Another "social finding" is that both first mover and second mover allocations to the public account are higher for visitors, that is, conference participants who are tourists.

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